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(1)2(3)Abstract: In June 2012, the General Medical Council 
(GMC) instituted a series of new rules that reformed their 
fitness to practise work. The most significant change to 
disciplinary proceedings was the formation of a Medical 
Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) which is led by a 
former Deputy High Court Judge. Aimed at safeguarding 
patient safety, the MPTS is an autonomous part of the GMC 
which will now adjudicate on all cases relating to doctors 
whose fitness to practise is called into question. With the new 
development, the GMC will continue to collect evidence and 
carry out the investigations, but the cases will be adjudicated 
by the tribunal which is empowered to impose sanctions 
against doctors’ registration. The fitness to practise panels which 
sit on these hearings are made up of medical and lay members 
who receive specific training and are regularly appraised. 
The hearings are conducted in public and the tribunal is 
accountable to Parliament. The GMC had hoped that the 
change would bolster public and professional confidence that 
these hearings are impartial, fair and transparent. They have 
described the change as “the biggest shake-up of fitness to 
practise hearings since they were first established in 1858” 
(GMC Press Release, 11 June 2012). This paper takes a 
look at the profile of the cases which the MPTS heard in the 
first year of its operation and assesses its scope for improving 
patient safety.
(1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 4th European 
Conference on Health Law, Coimbra, 9-11 October 2013. We thank the partici-
pants of the conference for their helpful comments and Jessica Hair for research 
assistance. 
(2) Senior Lecturer in Medical Law, University of Central Lancashire, UK. 
Email address: kachoong@uclan.ac.uk.
(3) Forensic Physician, Jersey. Email address: mbarrett@forensic-medical.
co.uk.
I. Introduction
“[T]he General Medical Council (GMC) was ‘doctor-
centred’. It appeared to assume that all doctors were good, 
competent and conscientious until proved otherwise. It 
would deal with the profession’s ‘bad apples’ for the sake of 
the profession. It would do so in its own way and did not 
welcome scrutiny. Its procedures were designed to be fair 
to doctors and to ensure that no doctor would lose his/her 
right to practise without very good cause. It did not focus 
on the reasonable expectations of the public and it did not 
see itself as having a duty to ensure that all members of 
the medical profession were willing and able to provide a 
proper professional service (4).”
This was the stern verdict of the Shipman 
Inquiry which was set up in 2001 to investigate the 
issues arising from how a British general practitioner 
— Dr Harold Shipman — managed to kill, with-
out detection, more than 200 of his patients over a 
period of 24 years (1974-1998). In its report, the 
Inquiry highlighted that since the GMC is the only 
authority that can erase or suspend a doctor’s right 
to practise medicine in the country, its Fitness to 
Practise (FTP) procedures are effectively the “teeth” 
(4) Smith, J., The Shipman Inquiry: Fifth Report — ‘Safeguarding Patients: 
Lessons from the Past — Proposals for the Future’, Command Paper Cm 6394 
(2004), chapter 15, paragraph 47.
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behind all other monitoring and disciplinary struc-
tures available in the health care system (5). 
The Council has since introduced a num-
ber of changes to its FTP procedures (6) in order 
to restore public faith in its ability to safeguard 
patient safety and to counter the perception that 
it is overly protective of doctors. One of the most 
recent initiatives was the setting up of the Medi-
cal Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) in June 
2012. Led by a former Deputy High Court Judge, 
with panels that consist of medical and lay members 
who receive specific training and who are regularly 
appraised, the MPTS would be an autonomous 
part of the GMC that adjudicates on all FTP cases 
that are brought to the Council’s attention. For 
this, it would be accountable to Parliament. The 
service, which was launched with the declared aim 
of protecting patients by making independent and 
impartial decisions concerning a doctor’s fitness to 
practise (7), has been described by the Council as 
“the biggest shake-up of fitness to practise hearings 
since they were first established in 1858 (8).” This 
paper studies the profile of the FTP cases that were 
heard in the first year of its operation (i.e from 1st 
August 2012 to 31st July 2013). Through this, it 
aims to assess the MPTS’ potential and limitations 
in protecting patients. 
The next section will provide an overview of 
the historical development of professional discipline 
(5) Ibid., Summary, paragraph 3.
(6) See discussion below.
(7) MPTS, ‘The role of the MPTS’, available at http://www.mpts-uk.org/
about/1595.asp. 
(8) GMC Press Release 11 June 2012, available at http://www.gmc-uk.
org/news/13286.asp.
in British Medicine. It seeks to show that although 
the GMC was authorised to discipline doctors from 
its inception in 1858, the approaches taken have 
largely been doctor-centred until the end of the 
20th century. It was only in the 21st century that 
a more patient-centred orientation was adopted and 
that this led to the creation of the MPTS in 2012. 
Section III will analyse the profile of the cases which 
the MPTS has sat on in its first year. It assesses its 
scope and limitations in enhancing patient safety 
before bringing the discussion to a close in Section 
IV. 
II.  The Historical Development of Professional 
Discipline
The connection between professional discipline 
and patient protection has not always been clear 
nor consistent throughout the history of the medi-
cal profession in the UK. In the early days, public 
protection was predicated on the integrity of the 
professional. This was illustrated by the Royal Col-
lege of Physicians (RCP)’s founding charter of 1518 
which described the college’s formation as “neces-
sary to withstand in good time the attempts of the 
wicked, and to curb the audacity of those wicked 
men who shall profess medicine more for the sake 
of their avarice than from the assurance of any good 
conscience, whereby very many inconveniences may 
ensue to the rude and credulous populace (9).” How-
ever, since the primary drive behind the establish-
(9) The Founding Charter from King Henry VIII, 1518 in G.N. Clark 
& A.S.A. Briggs, A History of the Royal College of Physicians of London: Volume 4 
(Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 1573.
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ment of the college was to ensure that power was 
vested in leading physicians of the time to grant 
licences to those qualified to practise Medicine (10), 
it would appear that the sentiments captured in the 
charter was as much about professional self-interest 
as it was about patient safety. 
With the inauguration of the GMC in 1858 (11) 
as the regulatory body of the medical profession in 
the UK, the public was able to distinguish between 
the “legally qualified or duly qualified (12)” doctors 
from those who are unqualified, through the Medi-
cal Register which this statutory body maintained. 
Although the Council was authorised to take actions 
against the doctor’s registration, this part of the dis-
cussion seeks to highlight that it was not until the 
21st century that a shift began to be made to a more 
patient-centred approach to professional discipline. 
A. The 19th and 20th Centuries
The GMC was known as the General Coun-
cil of Medical Education and Registration of the 
United Kingdom (13) when it was set up in 1858. 
The name reflects its two chief duties: to establish 
proper educational standards for the medical profes-
sion and to maintain a register of qualified practitio-
ners (14). From the outset, it was authorised to erase 
the names of those convicted of a criminal offence 
(10) Royal College of Physicians (RCP), ‘History of the RCP’, available at 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/about/history.
(11) By the Medical Act 1858.
(12) Ibid., section XXXIV. 
(13) The name was changed to the General Medical Council in 1951.
(14) Poynter, F.N.L., ‘The centenary of the General Medical Council’ 
(1958) British Medical Journal 1245 at 1246.
or those judged, after due inquiry by the Council’s 
Disciplinary Committee, to have been guilty of 
infamous conduct in any professional respect (15). 
Whilst acknowledging that it was impossible to 
compile an exhaustive list of what could amount to 
“infamous conduct in a professional respect”, the 
GMC indicated that there were a number of mis-
conducts that could raise disciplinary issues. (16) They 
included: adultery with patients; breach of medical 
confidentiality; the provision of untrue or mislead-
ing certificates; the commercialisation of a secret 
remedy; gross neglect in diagnosis or treatment; and 
improper attempts at profit at the expense of pro-
fessional colleagues (e.g. by canvassing for patients 
and advertising for the doctor’s own professional 
privilege) (17). All these, interestingly, gave rise to 
the belief on the part of the public that the primary 
concern of the Council was with professional ethics 
and discipline (18). 
Irvine nevertheless identified the role of the 
Council between 1858 and 1979 as being that 
of the traditional regulator — reactive, passive, 
extremely protective of doctors and unwilling to deal 
with poor medical practice (19). The few disciplinary 
(15) Section XXXIX, Medical Act 1858. 
(16) GMC, ‘Functions, procedure, and disciplinary jurisdiction’ (1965) 
pp. 7-8.
(17) As is clear from their focus, acts and omissions which did not take 
place in a professional respect (other than criminal offences), were not issues that 
merited disciplinary attention — see S. Mills, et. al., Disciplinary Procedure in 
the Statutory Professions (West Sussex: Bloomsbury Professional, 2011) pp. 39-41. 
This, as will be seen below, stands in stark contrast to the approach adopted by 
the MPTS.
(18) Finch, E., ‘The centenary of the General Council of Medical Education 
and Registration in relation to medical education’ (1958) 23(5) Annals of the Royal 
College of Surgeons of England 321.
(19) Irvine, D., ‘A short history of the General Medical Council’ (2006) 
40 Medical Education 202.
86
CHAPTER 1 The Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service: One Year On
Lex Medicinae, N.º Especial (2014) Coimbra Editora ®
charges it dealt with were concerned with criminal 
behaviour, adultery with patients and breaches of 
professional etiquette (20). Regarding the latter, the 
fact that canvassing for patients and advertising 
were deemed as professional offences signified that 
the emphasis of ethical conduct at the time was 
also directed towards issues between doctors (21). 
There were no guidelines drawn up to inform doctors 
and the public about what constituted good practice. 
The Council had instead preferred to use case law as 
the basis for advising doctors about misconduct (22). 
This allowed the profession itself to decide on what 
constituted a “good doctor” — and he was someone 
who complied with the professional norms (23) i.e. 
doing what was normally done, rather than what 
should ideally be done. Public protection was there-
fore not the Council’s priority then (24). 
Some changes were subsequently made to their 
disciplinary procedures in the period from 1980 to 
the end of the 20th century. This was in response 
to the hundreds of complaints which started to be 
received yearly from patients and official bodies 
about the behaviour of doctors (25). Complaints to 
(20) Ibid., p. 204.
(21) Stacey, M., The Sociology of Health and Healing (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988) p. 85.
(22) Irvine, D., op. cit., p. 205.
(23) See e.g. Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration 
[1894] 1 QB 750, per Lopes LJ at 763 and Bolam v. Friern Hospital Manage-
ment Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, per McNair J. at 587. For discussion, see 
J.B. Fanning, ‘Uneasy lies the neck that wears a stethoscope: some observations 
on defensive medicine’ (2008) Professional Negligence 93 and D. Thomas, ‘Peer 
review as an outmoded model for health practitioner regulation’ in I. Freckelton 
(ed.), Regulating Health Practitioners (New South Wales: The Federation Press, 
2005) pp. 58-59.
(24) Irvine, D., op. cit., p. 204.
(25) Hill, D., ‘The General Medical Council: frame of reference or arbiter 
of morals?’(1977) 3 Journal of Medical Ethics 110.
the GMC would now be directed through a num-
ber of committees. Cases involving conduct would 
undergo a three-stage process. At the first stage, 
a medical screener would decide whether the case 
should go no further or be referred for investiga-
tion. If the latter, the case will then be managed 
by the Preliminary Proceedings Committee (PPC) 
(stage two) which decided if there was sufficient 
merit in the case being referred to the Professional 
Conduct Committee (PCC)(stage three). The PCC 
was empowered to hold the hearing in public. A 
doctor whose conduct was found to have amounted 
to “serious professional misconduct” (SPM) can be 
reprimanded, be given conditions, suspended or have 
his name erased from the medical register (26). Cases 
involving the health of the practitioner (e.g. mental 
illness and alcohol and/or drug abuse) would be 
referred to the Health Committee which would 
arrange a medical examination of the doctor to 
determine whether his health seriously impeded his 
ability to practise medicine. If found proved, the 
doctor may be reprimanded; given conditions; or 
suspended; but not face erasure from the register (27). 
Cases involving performance were managed by an 
Assessment Panel that would determine if there was 
Seriously Deficient Performance (SDP) (28). The 
doctor could accept a statement of progress and he 
would be supervised until it was determined that his 
performance was satisfactory. Failure to comply or 
continued unsatisfactory performance would result 
in referral to the Committee on Professional Perfor-
(26) Section 36 of the Medical Act 1983.
(27) Section 37 of the Medical Act 1983.
(28) Medical Professional (Performance) Act 1995. 
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mance (CPP). Sanctions available to the Committee 
included suspension and placing conditions on the 
doctor’s practice (29).
The meaning of “serious professional miscon-
duct” (30), however, was difficult to ascertain. The 
GMC had never published agreed standards or the 
criteria and thresholds by which decisions could be 
taken. In time, the term had come to mean “profes-
sional misconduct of such a degree that the PCC 
considers it to be serious” (31). This is a circular 
definition (32). The PCC would acquit and take no 
action against a doctor if the available evidence did 
not satisfy the criminal standard of proof. According 
to the Shipman Inquiry, “the concept of negligence 
even if serious does not fit comfortably with Seri-
ous Professional Misconduct (33).” The PCC’s need 
to feel “sure” (i.e. beyond reasonable doubt) about 
the culpability of the doctor meant that many doc-
tors were allowed to continue unrestricted practice 
irrespective of how poor their clinical practice had 
been (34). Professional discipline’s concern about 
being “fair to doctors” thereby left patients and 
the public insufficiently protected (35). Further, the 
presence of 3 separate routes for professional dis-
cipline was also deeply confusing for the public. 
(29) For further discussion, see A. Samanta & J. Samanta, ‘Regulation of 
the medical profession: fantasy, reality and legality’ (2004) 97 Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 211 at 216.
(30) A term which was brought in to replace “infamous conduct in a 
professional respect”.
(31) Dalton, K. J., ‘Physician licensing and disciplining in England and 
Europe’ in American College of Legal Medicine, Legal Medicine (Philadelphia: 
Mosby, 2004) p. 690.
(32) Ibid. 
(33) Smith, J., op. cit., p. 110.
(34) Dalton, K.J., op. cit., p. 690.
(35) Smith, J., op. cit., chapter 6.
This deterred complaints or caused those who did 
complain to grow weary as a consequence of having 
to “negotiate something of an obstacle course (36)”. 
B. The 21st Century
It was not until the 21st century that the bal-
ance between protecting doctors on the one hand 
and the public on the other, started to tip towards 
safeguarding patients. This change of emphasis was 
prompted by the escalation in the number of com-
plaints received by the GMC and the emergence of 
a string of high profile cases which came to light at 
around the same time as the Shipman case. These 
included the scandal at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
where substandard cardiac surgery on infants as 
performed by 2 surgeons resulted in high rates of 
death; the case of Dr Richard Neale who did not 
provide appropriate care to his patients and which 
resulted in 2 deaths; the case of Dr Clifford Ayling 
who committed indecent assault on a number of his 
female patients; and the case of Drs William Kerr 
and Michael Haslam — 2 psychiatrists who sexually 
abused their female patients over many years (37). 
Consequently, the Fitness to Practise Rules 2004 
were created (38). The 3 types of hearing (conduct, 
(36) Baker, R., ‘Patient-centred care after Shipman’ (2004) 97 Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 161 at 164.
(37) For further discussion, see e.g. M. Dixon-Woods et. al., ‘Why is UK 
medicine no longer a self-regulating profession? The role of scandals involving 
“bad apple” doctors’ (2011) 73(10) Social Science & Medicine 1452; M. Davis, 
Medical Self-Regulation: Crisis and Change (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
2007) pp. 121-242.
(38) GMC, ‘Reform of the fitness to practise procedures at the GMC: 
Changes to the way we deal with cases at the end of an investigation’ (Consulta-
tion paper) p. 11.
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health and performance) were amalgamated into a 
single test of impaired fitness to practise (FTP). The 
GMC would investigate the complaints received, 
collect evidence and hear those cases. If a doctor’s 
fitness to practise is found impaired, then sanctions 
can be applied that ranged from no further action, 
through to warnings, conditions, suspension and 
erasure from the medical register. The Council also 
published Good Medical Practice which represents a 
set of duties jointly regarded as important by doc-
tors and the public (39). The document was to be 
the new set of guidelines against which fitness to 
practise was judged (40). 
In 2012, the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Ser-
vice (MPTS) was established by Parliament. It pro-
vides a hearing service that is fully independent in its 
decision-making and separate from the investigatory 
role of the GMC. Now, in a three stage process, the 
GMC sets out the allegations against the doctor and 
presents evidence. The case continues if, in a private 
session, the MPTS panel finds the facts proved. Stage 
two commences where the panel hears, in public 
evidence, from the GMC as to whether the doctor’s 
fitness to practise is impaired. At the final stage of the 
proceedings, the panel makes a decision on sanctions.
Although the panellists can exercise their dis-
cretion as to the sanctions to be exercised, they are 
required to refer to the guidance developed by the 
GMC on this matter (41). This, according to the 
GMC, is for purposes of promoting consistency and 
(39) Irvine, D., op. cit., p. 207.
(40) Ibid. 
(41) GMC, ‘Indicative Sanctions Guidance for the Fitness to Practise 
Panel’, April 2009 (with 7 August 2009 revisions, March 2012 revisions and 
March 2013 revisions).
transparency in decision-making. (42) The primary 
aim of sanctions is “the protection of patients and 
the wider public interest (i.e. maintenance of pub-
lic confidence in the profession and declaring and 
upholding proper standards of conduct and behav-
iour) (43)”. According to the guidance, if a doctor’s 
fitness to practise is not found to be impaired, the 
panel could conclude the case by either taking no 
action or by issuing a warning. When a warning is 
issued, this would be because the doctor’s perfor-
mance has departed significantly from Good Medical 
Practice or where it has given rise to significant cause 
for concern following an assessment (44). The warning, 
which would be in relation to the doctor’s future 
conduct or performance (rather than his health), 
would need to be disclosed to the complainant, 
the doctor’s employer and any other enquirer (45). It 
would also be published on the GMC website for a 
period of 5 years (46).
Where a finding is made that the doctor’s fitness 
to practise is impaired, four options are available to 
the panel. One would be to take no action against 
a doctor’s registration if the doctor has demonstrated 
considerable insight into his/her behaviour and has 
already undergone and completed any remedial 
actions which he/she would otherwise be required 
by the panel to undertake (47). The panel can also 
impose conditions (48) on the doctor’s registration 
(42) Ibid., p. 4.




(47) Ibid., p. 14.
(48) E.g. restricting the doctor’s employment to NHS posts; disallowing him 
from carrying out a particular procedure; or making him undergo remediation or 
retraining — ibid., p. 17.
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for a period of up to three years (but renewable for 
up to 36 months thereafter); suspend the doctor’s 
registration for up to 12 months; and erase the doc-
tor’s name from the register (49). Although the panel 
maintains that its “decision is not intended to be 
punitive” (50), it concedes that the sanctions “may 
have a punitive effect (51)”. 
III. The MPTS and Patient Safety
A. Cases from 1 August 2012 to 31 July 2013
The MPTS heard 173 cases in the period 
between 1st August 2012 and 31st July 2013. The 
hearings are open to the public. The details and out-
comes of those hearings are published on the MPTS 
website and members of the public can access them 
without charge. From these, it is possible to identify, 
inter alia, the decisions of the panel as to whether 
impairment was present; the sanctions taken; the 
grounds for the investigation; the year that the regis-
trable qualification was obtained; and the institution 
granting the registrable qualification. 
As can be seen from the table below, the MPTS 
decided to take no further action for 39 of the cases 
heard, and 10 registered practitioners were given a 
warning. Thus in over 70% of the cases heard last 
year, the doctors’ fitness to practise was found to be 
impaired. Conditions were imposed on the registra-
tion of 18 of those doctors while 53 others were 
(49) Ibid., p. 13.
(50) Ibid., p. 7.
(51) Ibid.
suspended. The most serious sanction, i.e. erasure, 
was also applied to the registration of 53 doctors. 
Outcome Numbers Percentage
No action taken 39 22.54
Warnings issued 10 5.78




Erasure from register 53 30.64
Total 173 100
Table 1: Outcomes of cases heard by the MPTS  
between 1/8/2012 and 31/7/2013
In the majority of the cases that came before the 
MPTS in this period (i.e. up to 119 or 69%), the 
medical practitioners have been qualified for 15 up 
to 35 years. This strongly indicates that questions 
over their fitness to practise bears little relation to 
lack of professional experience. Another notable 
factor is that up to 107 or 62% of the overall cases 
heard concerned overseas doctors i.e. those who 
received their medical degree from outside the UK. 
This seems to be a continuation of an ongoing 
trend. As far back as 1989, Smith has noted that 
although overseas doctors were under represented on 
the GMC, they were over represented among those 
appearing before the Professional Conduct Commit-
tee (52). Other commentators have also commented 
on this trend in the 1990s and early 21st century (53). 
(52) Smith R, ‘Profile of the GMC: Overseas doctors: diminishing contro-
versy’ (1989) 298(6685) British Medical Journal 1441.
(53) See e.g. F. Goodlee, ‘The GMC, racism and complaints against doctors’ 
(1996) 312 (7042) British Medical Journal 1314; P. Moszynski, ‘GMC to look 
into higher number of complaints against overseas trained doctors’ (2007) 335 
British Medical Journal 
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There is nevertheless no clear association between 
ethnicity and the tendency to appear before an FTP 
panel among UK-qualified doctors (54). 
B. Patient Protection: Potential and Limitations
1. Potential 
As regards the MPTS’ potential for public pro-
tection, it is undoubtedly the case that a complaint 
dealt with within the MPTS’ FTP framework has 
greater potential to protect the public especially 
when compared to the malpractice framework. For 
one, whilst there is a need to prove that an alleged 
wrongdoing has led to injury when pursuing a 
medical negligence case against a doctor, there is 
no equivalent requirement for any harm or damage 
to have occurred before a doctor can be disciplined 
by the MPTS. Taking a closer look at the profiles 
highlighted above, incidents which have resulted 
in sanctions being applied include where the doc-
tor has: kept diaries which contained derogatory 
and sexualised information about his patients; (55) 
accessed pornographic material at work (56); created 
pornographic images purporting to be of a male 
patient with female colleagues (57); left another doc-
tor who should have been under his direct supervi-
sion unsupervised (58); demonstrated a cavalier atti-
(54) Humphrey, C., et. al., ‘Clarifying the factors associated with progression 
of cases in the GMC’s Fitness to Practise procedures’ (2009) RES-153-25-0101 p. 32.
(55) Case number 2654896.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Case number 2803157.
tude to patient care (59); and amended his patient’s 
medical records a number of times after receiving a 
letter from a solicitor regarding a possible medical 
negligence claim (60). Other cases include where the 
doctor has: treated his patient in a brusque, uncaring 
and rude fashion (61); displayed a dismissive attitude 
to criticism (62); did not carry professional indemnity 
insurance (63); produced a dishonest and exaggerated 
report for a patient’s insurance claim that was not 
based on a clinical assessment of the patient (64); 
provided dishonest information to obtain employ-
ment (65); accepted paid clinical work as a locum 
general practitioner elsewhere when on authorised 
sick leave at his place of work (66); rewrote and 
replaced some pages of a patient’s medical records; (67) 
and demonstrated inappropriate and sexually moti-
vated behaviour towards his colleagues (68).
Although those incidents may not have pro-
duced any direct and discernible injury to the doc-
tors’ patients, they demonstrate that MPTS’ FTP 
hearings do not wait until something has gone 
wrong before actions are taken. Rather, they identify 
risks from the doctors’ behaviour and take appropri-
ate action proactively. Thus unlike malpractice law 
which acts retrospectively and offers remedies after 
(59) Ibid. 
(60) Case number 1711880.
(61) Case number 4271938.
(62) Case number 6109941.
(63) Case number 5194517.
(64) Case number 6034254.
(65) Case number 5180486.
(66) Case number 4160133.
(67) Case number 4277886. 
(68) Case number 4330468.
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an incident has resulted in injury (69), these hearings 
tend to look forward and not back (70), This pre-
ventative posture (71) also has the capacity to protect 
the safety of a wide pool of patients. In a success-
ful medical negligence suit, the finding of liability 
would only benefit one patient (i.e. through the 
award of monetary compensation to the one who 
instituted the claim) (72). MPTS actions, by putting a 
stop on acts and omissions which do not constitute 
good professional practice, stand to benefit everyone 
who is likely to be treated by the doctor in the pres-
ent and the future. 
Additionally, the cases heard in the first year 
of the MPTS’ operation also demonstrate that 
FTP hearings deal not only with clinical, but also 
non-clinical matters. Cases for which sanctions 
were applied include situations where the doctor 
has: posted obscene photos of his ex-girlfriend on 
Facebook (73); falsified qualifications on his CV (74); 
shown paedophile tendencies (75); taken indecent 
photos of women in public without their consent (76); 
taken part in violent disorder at a public protest (77); 
and falsely claimed on his CV that he was a con-
tributing author on a number of publications (78). 
(69) Geraghty, C., ‘Advancing patient safety in Ireland: the American model 
and cultural change’ (2009) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 27 at 28.
(70) Meadow v. General Medical Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 per Sir 
Anthony Clarke MR at paragraph 32.
(71) Geraghty, C., op. cit., p. 31.
(72) Timms, M., ‘Referring a doctor to the General Medical Council’ 
(2006) Journal of Personal Injury Law 36 at 39.
(73) Case number 5180080.
(74) Case number 6046047.
(75) Case number 6024833.
(76) Case number 7079875.
(77) Case number 6110813.
(78) Case number 3679731.
Some of those cases came to the attention of the 
GMC because the offences had been dealt with by 
the criminal justice system (79).
In regulating doctors’ behaviour both during 
work and outside of work, the MPTS is, as high-
lighted earlier, of the view that the public interest 
extends beyond public protection to embrace the 
maintenance of public confidence in the profession, 
and the upholding of proper standards of conduct 
and behaviour. The significance of this is underlined 
by the fact that registered medical practitioners are 
entrusted with clinical and non-clinical responsi-
bilities (80). These duties may range from signing 
prescriptions and death certificates, through to 
various other certificates such as verifying the details 
on passport applications. Clearly a doctor with 
impaired integrity in those areas that the ordinary 
individual might assume to be private, will always be 
subject to suspicions that his professional life could 
be compromised (81). Consequently, Good Medical 
Practice (82) and the MPTS (and now the revalidation 
process (83)) all place integrity as an important com-
ponent in maintaining public trust.
(79) It is mandatory for doctors to notify the GMC if they come into 
contact with the criminal justice system as offenders — see GMC, ‘Guidance on 
convictions, cautions and determinations’ (April 2013).
(80) Hesketh, W., ‘The police-health professions’ protocol: a review’ (2012) 
Police Journal 203 at 205; McFarlane, G., ‘Clinical negligence disputes’ (2003) 
Journal of Personal Injury Law 71 at 77. 
(81) The MPTS’ stance on this is similar to that of the Rehabilitation 
of Offenders Act 1974. Although this statute protects offenders from having to 
disclose their previous criminal convictions when applying for jobs and insurance 
after a rehabilitation period, this provision does not apply to doctors.
(82) GMC, Good Medical Practice (March 2013), paragraph 1. 
(83) See e.g. GMC, ‘Supporting information for appraisal and revalidation’ 
(2012) pp. 3-4.
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2. Limitations
The MPTS’ role in safeguarding patient safety 
is nevertheless compromised on a number of fronts. 
Firstly, the MPTS seems to be following a redemp-
tive model. When determining the appropriate sanc-
tion for a doctor’s wrongdoing, the MPTS panels 
are expected to consider mitigating factors in two 
circumstances: where the doctor has demonstrated 
insight into the problem and his/her attempts to 
address it (84); and evidence of his/her overall adher-
ence to important principles of good practice (85). 
Also of relevance are testimonials, personal hardship, 
work-related stress, lack of training and supervision 
at work (86). The “insight” expected is for the doc-
tor to be “able to stand back and accept that, with 
hindsight, they should have behaved differently, 
and that it is expected that he/she will take steps to 
prevent a recurrence” (87). Assessing insight is always 
difficult, but in a redemptive model where the sever-
ity of sanction is linked to the degree of insight, it is 
important that the insight and remorse are genuine 
and not just words and attitudes superficially dis-
played to lessen any penalty that might be meted 
out. It goes without saying that testimonials, support 
and remedial training will have little effect on future 
(84) These could include admission of what took place; apologies extended 
by the doctor to the complainant; and efforts made to prevent such behaviour 
recurring or to rectify any deficiencies in performance — GMC (2009), op. cit., 
p. 8. 
(85) E.g. by keeping up to date; and working within his/her area of com-
petence. Consideration could also be taken of his/her character; the circumstances 
leading up to the incidents; and whether this is the first time that a finding has 
been made against him/her — ibid. 
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid., p. 10.
practice if the doctor does not fully understand the 
reasons behind the initial complaint or comply with 
strategies to improve performance (88). 
Secondly, whether a doctor’s impaired fitness to 
practise actually comes to the GMC’s and MPTS’ 
attention depends on the assistance and cooperation 
of others. This means that a problem can go unde-
tected if patients, employers, colleagues and/or other 
bodies are unwilling to come forward and report 
the doctor to the GMC (89). Here it is pertinent to 
note that Good Medical Practice directs practitioners 
who have concerns that a colleague may not be fit 
to practise, to ask for advice from a colleague, their 
defence body or the GMC. If their concerns have 
not been addressed, they are to report the matter in 
accordance with GMC guidance and their workplace 
policy (90). However, doctors are generally reluctant 
to criticise and report one another because of a 
sense of shared vulnerability (91). Indeed, as pointed 
out recently by Robert Francis QC in the Report of 
the Public Inquiry into the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust (92), there is a culture of profes-
sional disengagement among health care practitioners 
where many, including Consultants, had preferred to 
keep their heads down and not challenge or manage 
(88) Case, P., ‘The good, the bad and the dishonest doctor: the General 
Medical Council and the “redemption model” of fitness to practise’ (2011) 31(4) 
Legal Studies 591 at 611-612.
(89) Baker, R., ‘Patient-centred care after Shipman’ (2004) Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 161; Davies, A.C.L., ‘Mixed signals: using educational 
and punitive approaches to regulate the medical profession’ (2002) Public Law 
703 at 722.
(90) Good Medical Practice, op. cit., paragraph 25(c).
(91) Davies, M., op. cit., p. 249.
(92) Francis, R., Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry (2013), Executive Summary.
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with any vigour (93). He recognised that whilst it 
cannot be suggested that such a passive and disen-
gaged culture “are present everywhere in the system 
all of the time,… their existence anywhere means 
that there is an insufficiently shared positive culture (94)” 
which prioritises patient safety. 
And neither does the current set-up, which 
holds hearings in public, has a punitive effect and 
makes available the outcomes of hearings on the 
internet, incentivise doctors to openly admit and 
voluntarily report their own substandard clinical 
practices, wrongdoings, mistakes or adverse inci-
dents. For one, they would expose themselves to 
the possibility of fitness to practise hearings and/
or legal reprisals. More importantly, as pointed 
out by commentators, any system which names 
and shames encourages secrecy and cover-up, 
rather than the candour needed to improve patient 
safety (95). Further, since many errors in medical 
practice (including medication, procedures and diag-
nosis) can be externally induced (96) and arise from 
the complexity of the healthcare delivery system 
itself (97), the FTP hearings conducted by the MPTS 
that can only address an individual doctor’s practice 
(93) Ibid., paragraph 1.8.
(94) Ibid., paragraph 1.117.
(95) Quick, O., ‘Patient safety and the problem and potential of law’ 
(2012) Professional Negligence 78; Haynes, K., ‘Clinical risk management: reality 
or rhetoric? Experience from the UK — a personal view’ (2003) Medico-Legal 
Journal of Ireland 83 at 86. 
(96) Reason, J., Human Error (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) p. 15.
(97) Kopec, D., et. al., ‘Human errors in medical practice: a systematic clas-
sification and reduction with automated information systems’ available at http://
www.scibrooklyn.cuny.edu/~kopec/research/new/Final_J_Med_Sys_10_16_02.pdf/.
may not adequately address patient safety where the 
problem is of a systemic nature (98). 
IV. Conclusion 
The GMC, in its role as the regulator of the 
medical profession in the UK, has been vested since 
its inception in 1858 with the power to discipline 
doctors by taking action against their registra-
tion. However, this power has been used sparingly 
throughout its history and when exercised, it was 
not always driven by concerns over patient safety 
or protection. Neither have the processes involved 
always been clear and transparent to the public. The 
Shipman case and a number of other high-profile 
cases which emerged in the full glare of media 
publicity at the beginning of the 20th century have 
drawn attention to questions about how the GMC 
reacts to the increase in the number of unethical 
and incompetent doctors (99). Keen to assuage ris-
ing criticism that it is overly protective of doctors, 
fitness to practise underwent a profound change in 
the last 10 years or so. One of the most recent and 
significant reforms is the launch of the MPTS as an 
independent adjudicatory body in June 2012. 
In the first year of its operation, the MPTS 
heard 173 cases. In over 70% of those cases, the 
doctors’ fitness to practise was found to be impaired 
and sanctions were meted out. These were over 
issues that arose in medical practice and in the 
doctors’ private lives. As discussed, the MPTS’ will-
(98) Timms, M., op. cit., p. 37.
(99) Lowe, M., et. al., ‘Is it possible to assess the “ethics” of medical school 
applicants?’ (2001) 27 Journal of Medical Ethics 404.
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ingness and ability to take action in both of these 
spheres could certainly engender a safer environment 
for patients. By holding its hearings in the open 
and by publishing the details and outcomes of its 
FTP hearings on the internet, these also make the 
process transparent to the public and could serve as 
a strong incentive on the part of doctors to avoid 
irresponsible and unacceptable behaviour. However, 
the earlier discussion also expressed concern that this 
“name and shame” approach could be detrimental to 
patient safety as could the redemptive model adopted 
which may encourage exaggerated or feigned remorse 
or insight to escape a heavier penalty. 
It is therefore difficult to predict, on the basis of 
its first year’s work, whether the current framework 
is the best solution to the call for more effective 
public protection. It is too early to tell and the 
MPTS should be given the opportunity to prove 
its worth. The potential to evolve new processes, 
however, gives rise to optimism that the GMC can 
indeed meet the challenges of changes both in soci-
ety and the delivery of medical services. 
